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ABSTRACT The security of resources in a corporate network is always important to the organization. For 
this reason, different techniques such as firewall, Intrusion Detection Systems are important. Years of long 
research have resulted in the contribution of different advancements in these techniques. Artificial 
Intelligence, machine learning techniques, soft computing techniques and bio-inspired techniques have been 
efficient in detecting advanced network attacks. However, very often different new attacks are mostly 
successful in breaching these detection techniques. This very reason has been a motivation for us to explore 
the biological aspects and its defense mechanisms for designing a secure network model. After much study, 
we have identified that plants have a very well established and evolved detection and a response mechanism 
to pathogens. In this research work we have proposed and implemented a network attack detection and a 
response model inspired by plants. It is a three-layered model in analogy to three-layer defense mechanism 
of plants to pathogens. We further have tested the proposed model to different network attacks and have 
compared the results to Open Source Intrusion Detection System, Snort. The experimental results also 
establish that the model is competent to detect and trigger an automated response whenever required.  
INDEX TERMS Bio-inspired computing, Intrusion detection system, Fuzzy Logic, Network attacks
I. INTRODUCTION 
The network security of an organization is accomplished by 
installation of different security software and hardware 
systems such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, 
Honeypot etc. Software based Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) are trained with different training corpus. Learning 
incorporated in the IDS during training may either be static 
i.e. non-evolutionary or dynamic i.e. evolutionary. 
Evolutionary means that the learning evolves with every 
new encounter of instances. Such learning is also known as 
online learning and IDS using such approaches are known 
as online learning-based IDS. The literature survey shows 
that online IDS are susceptible to different learning attacks 
[1,2]. The attacker, therefore, with some knowledge of the 
learning algorithm can always try to influence the 
classification behavior of the algorithm. So, it is important 
that any detection system have a subsequent response 
component so that whenever the detection engine fails, the 
response engine is activated to protect the network resource 
from further compromise. This behaviour of attack 
detection and a subsequent response generation is most 
obvious among living organisms such as human body. 
Other mammals such as bats design an efficient network 
attack detection and a response system and so the living 
organisms in nature can play an important role in providing 
new inspiration. This led to the motivation of exploring 
different organisms in nature such as pitcher plants, fish, 
bats, vagotomized rats etc. and plants [3,4,5]. After 
extensive study of different living creatures in nature we 
discovered that plant is one such organism with a well-
established evolutionary multi-layer defense system along 
with a bio-molecular mechanism of information flow called 
SAR (Systemic Acquired Resistance) as in [6,7]. 
Studying the defense mechanism of plants to build a 
defense and a response model in computer networks is the 
first of its kind amongst the computer researchers. The 
defense and the response model designed, developed and 
implemented has been termed as PIRIDS i.e. Plant-based 
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Inspiration of Response in IDS (Intrusion Detection 
System).  
 
II. PLANTS DEFENSE MECHANISM 
Plants have a very well established and evolved defense 
mechanism. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. The zig-zag plant defense model [9] 
 
The plants defense model can be represented as four 
phase zig-zag model [9] shown in Figure 1. In phase 1, the 
PRR (Pattern Recognition Receptors) of the plant recognizes 
any previously known PAMP (Pathogen Associated 
Molecular Pattern) or MAMP (Microbes Associated 
Molecular Pattern). The PAMP are molecules associated 
with pathogens and these molecules are no way associated 
with the molecules of plants. The pattern recognition 
receptors are technically a sequence of gene codes. 
Whenever, a pathogen tries to enter the plant body, the PRR 
tries to look for any matching gene sequence of the pathogen 
with itself. If it finds one, it identifies the pathogen and 
triggers primary response. One such response is closing the 
stomata present in the leaves of the plant so that more 
microbes cannot enter the plant body through the pores. The 
pattern recognition receptors in plants have undergone 
hundreds of years of evolution. With evolution the ability of 
pattern recognition receptors to detect varying number of 
pathogens have increased significantly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Guard model in plants 
 
The pathogen molecules are also known as effectors. As 
soon as the PRR recognizes these effectors, a PTI (Pattern 
Triggered Immunity) is initiated. The consequence of such 
activity is to halt effector proliferation by closing the stomata 
in the leaf, deposition of callose for increasing cell wall 
thickness and accumulation of defense related proteins such 
as glucanases. Callose is a plant polysaccharide made by the 
Glucan Synthase-Like gene (GLS) within a plant and it is 
produced to act as a temporary cell wall in response to 
stimuli such as stress or damage. However, all the type of 
pathogens may not be recognized by PRR. Pathogens which 
successfully breach PRR, enters the plant body and targets 
the critical proteins of the plant. These critical proteins are 
always guarded by another set of proteins called the guard 
proteins. This form of defense mechanism is the second layer 
of defense in plants. The guard proteins observe for any 
changes in the critical proteins due to phosphorylation by 
effectors. These guard proteins are the R-genes in plants and 
encode NB-LRR protein as shown in Figure 2. If any 
changes are observed, localized defense are initiated which 
results in Hyper Response (HR) in plants [10]. This type of 
response is popular in the presence of multiple pathogens. 
This approach is called the guard model in plants [11]. In 
HR, the plants kill his local section such that the infection 
cannot spread further from that region to other uninfected 
parts of the plant. This is the third layer of defense that plants 
initiate as the highest response to pathogens. 
 
Induced systemic resistance in plants 
Plants also adopts a mechanism called systemic acquired 
resistance (SAR). By the mechanism of SAR, the 
information about primary pathogens are carried across distal 
parts for induced resistance, so that the plants can 
immediately respond to second time encounter of the known 
pathogens. Even though plants do not have a circulatory 
system the message propagation from one end to the other is 
well accomplished. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. SAR in plants [12] 
 
The beginning of SAR is marked by increased density of 
salicylic acid in the phloem. Phloem is the living tissue in 
plants that conduct foods made in the leaves to all other parts 
of the plant. Whenever, there is an infection by pathogen, 
there results in production of mobile immune signals such as 
Methyl Salicylic Acid (MeSA), Azelaic acid, Glycerol-3-
Phosphate (G3P) and the lipid transfer proteins Defective in 
Induced Resistance 1 (DIR1) and Azelaic Acid (AZI1). 
These signals travels through the phloem in the plant body in 
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the form of Salicylic acid. Accumulation of SA in the distal 
part induces pathogenesis related (PR) proteins with 
antimicrobial property. This metabolic reaction is shown in 
Figure 3. As can be seen from the figure, after primary 
pathogen infection as shown in the light brown shaded leaf, 
and because of ETI (Effector Triggered Immunity), different 
molecules such as G3P, MeSA, and Azelaic acid are formed.  
Any protein present in a plant body is termed as SAR protein 
provided the protein have a role in building resistance in the 
plant. Literature study indicates that varying level of SA 
concentration in plant body is an indication of any pathogen 
presence in the plant body. The amount of SA found in the 
plant body is considerably high during pathogen infection. 
III. FUZZY LOGIC 
Proposed for the first time in 1965 by Lotfi. A. Zadeh while 
working in the electrical engineering in the university of 
California, fuzzy set and fuzzy systems started gaining wide 
popularity during late 90’s. Real life problems which were 
otherwise difficult to represent in crisp form were started to 
represent using fuzzy approach. Fuzzy indicates vagueness 
and the degree of uncertainty [32,34,45]. In classical 
mathematics an object either belongs to a set of Universe 
say ‘U’ or don’t belongs to the set U. If the element belongs 
to the set than it is 1 else 0. This set of objects is called the 
‘crisp set’. The membership of the object x to set A can be 
indicated as shown below. 
 
µA(x) =  1, if x ∈ A and 0 if x ∉ A 
 
 The degree of measure in a given context can be 
quantified by high, moderate and low. This degree of 
association can be technically coined as membership value 
[33]. Mathematically it can be formulated as shown in 
equation below. 
µA:x → [0,1] 
 
µA:x indicates the degree of membership of x to set A. A 
minimum degree value of 0 indicates that x is least bound 
to set A and a value of 1 indicates that x is strongly bound 
to set A. Any other value between 0 and 1 indicates the 
varying degree of strength by which x is bound to set A. 
As seen from figure 4, the boundary of the crisp set is 
rigid i.e. the membership function value can be either 0 or 1 
and no other values between 0 and 1. But this is not true in 
cases of fuzzy set. The fuzzy set have values in closed 
interval [0,1] indicating the membership degree may vary 
from 0 to 1. The pattern variation of this membership 
degree may be triangular or a linear transformation. A 
membership degree of 1 indicates the highest degree of 
belonging of an element to a given set/class whereas a 
membership degree of 0 indicates the most loose bound of 
the element to the given set/class.  
 
 
FIGURE 4. Classical set and fuzzy set boundary 
 
Fuzzy set representation: A fuzzy set is represented by an 
ordered pair where the first element of the ordered pair 
represents the element belonging to a set and the second 
element represents the degree of membership of the 
element to the set. Mathematically it can be represented as 
in equation below [32,33]. 
Á = {(x, µÁ(x) | x ∈ X} 
The membership function can be standard functions such as 
Gaussian or any user defined function in requirement to the 
problem domain. 
IV. PROPOSED METHOD OF PIRIDS 
PIRIDS is an abbreviation of Plant-based Inspiration of 
Response in IDS. It is a three-layered bioinspired detection 
and a response method derived as an inspiration from the 
plant biology. The defense model in plants can be shown 
concisely as a three-layered approach as illustrated in the 
figure 5 and in previous work of the authors [8]. However, 
the work in [8] was confined to the proposed theoretical 
model without any practical implementation to establish the 
proposed model. The research work presented in this paper 
establish the validity of the proposed model with 
experimental results.  
 
 
FIGURE 5. Three-layer defense in plants 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the first layer of defense in plants 
is PRR (Pattern Recognition Receptors). The PRR in plants 
are responsible of detecting external pathogens or bacteria. 
After detection, PRR also initiates innate immunity called 
PTI (Pattern Triggered Immunity) [13]. As discussed in 
section II, the response of level 1 detection in plants is 
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production of reactive oxygen species, ethylene production, 
callose deposition etc. for strengthening cell wall and 
expression of defense genes. Pathogens that breach PTI 
deploy huge number of effectors for widespread pathogen 
virulence. These effectors target certain proteins in plants. 
The effectors try to form a bond with the protein components 
resulting in phosphorylation of RPM1 interacting protein 4 
(RIN4) [14]. This modification is observed by R protein. The 
consequence of such action is the activation of SAR 
(Systemic Acquired Resistance) [15,16], where the primary 
pathogen information is carried to distal part of the plant. 
This helps in a quicker response to the secondary infection. 
In the extreme case to stop plant virulence propagation from 
the infected part to distal regions, plants adopt an effective 
response leading to localized cell death. This mechanism in 
plants is known as HR (Hyper Sensitive Response) [17]. 
Each of the layer consists different types of agents. The 
proposed three layer of defense model, PIRIDS, will be 
active in all the critical nodes. A node is critical if it is stores 
critical data or host crucial services. For example, the servers 
or the data warehouse systems used in a network are crucial 
nodes. The first layer of defense i.e. level 1 consists of 
different types of receptor agents. Each of the receptor agent 
is designed with an objective of detecting a specific type of 
intrusion attempt. Different receptor agents and their role is 
briefly discussed in the next section. All the incoming 
packets are sniffed, and the respective extracted feature 
vector of a packet is passed to every receptor agent. Different 
receptor agents use this feature vector for detecting different 
types of attacks. The receptor agents use the pattern matching 
or rule matching approaches like PRR in plants. Whenever a 
receptor agent detects an intrusion attempt, it generates a 
fuzzy membership value corresponding to that connection as 
discussed in the following sections. This newly generated 
fuzzy membership value is added to previously stored value. 
If the resultant value exceeds the fuzzy threshold the source 
IP address is blocked. This new fuzzy membership value is 
distributed to other peers in the network. Other peers update 
this value with the previously stored value. If the value 
exceeds the threshold value in other peers as well, they take 
similar measures. Every other critical node maintains a table 
of the list of fuzzy values of different connections. This 
becomes the universal fuzzy membership value against the 
respective IP address in the network. The algorithm of the 
proposed method PIRIDS is given in Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1: PIRIDS (Plant-based Inspiration of 
Response in IDS) Method  
Agents ← Receptor agents {SQL injection detector agent, 
Slowloris detector agent, SYN flood detector agent, 
TCP/UDP flood detector agent, Honeypot agent, SSH 
worm detector agent, Monitor agent} 
CR ← Critical resource directory 
Processes initialization and activation: P ← set of process 
running in the system. 
PM ← Malicious process breaching receptor agent-based 
detection i.e. level 1. 
PL    ←    p Є P i.e. set of all process accessing files Є CR 
F ← Fuzzy membership value of PL 
FL ← files accessed by PL 
Activate all agents; 
While agents are up and running do: 
A ← Receptor agents sniff incoming packet 
EV ← Extracted feature vector of A. 
Pass EV to all receptor agents; 
FMV ← 0 //fuzzy membership value 
FMVEV ← generate fuzzy membership value against EV; 
New FMVEV    ← FMVEV  + FMV; 
If (FMVEV  >  Threshold), then: 
Take action on the IP address against a given EV; 
Distribute FMVEV  to peers; 
 Else  
Distribute FMVEV  to peers; 
Peers update their respective stored FMV; 
Monitor agent identifies PM; 
P ← P + PM; 
Monitor agent identifies PL; 
Compute F; 
If (F > Threshold) then: 
Block all the process in PL; 
Update fuzzy membership value of PL in its table. 
Distribute F to peers; 
E ← Entropy of FL calculated 
If (E is high), then: 
Initiate file recovery; 
Request peers for all the critical files; 
 Else: 
Monitor the Entropy of all the files accessed; 
 If (Number of FL is High and E is High), then: 
Initiate Hyper Response i.e. terminate temporarily 
the system in the network to stop probable 
propagation of malicious process; 
 
In the Algorithm 1, agents are instantiated and activated. 
The agents are the programs created to meet different 
objectives. For example, the Slowloris detector agent is 
responsible for detecting slowloris attack attempt. Once the 
agents are up, the receptor agents sniff for all the incoming 
packets. The feature vector of each packet is extracted and 
stored in variable EV, where EV is the feature vector 
representation of each packet. The fuzzy membership value 
for the EV is computed. If this value exceeds the threshold, 
the connecting IP is blocked, and the fuzzy value will be 
distributed in the network. For experimental approach the 
fuzzy membership value threshold is fixed at 0.5. For 
different intrusions, different fuzzy membership function is 
adopted and discussed in section IV. If the fuzzy membership 
value corresponding to a source IP address is equal to 0.5, 
then it lies in the boundary of being a normal and anomaly 
address. If the value exceeds 0.5, the source IP address 
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inclines towards being more anomaly and hence it is blocked. 
This value of 0.5 as a standard threshold has been adopted in 
our work. Similar activity takes place with the monitor agent. 
If fuzzy membership value of a process exceeds the threshold, 
that process is blocked in the system. If too many intrusions 
are detected, the end system is temporarily terminated in the 
network. 
The agents are different programs that are created to meet 
different objectives. As seen in the Algorithm 1, for example 
SQL injection detector agent is created to identify if any SQL 
injection on the critical node have been attempted or not. 
Likewise, the different agents are created for accomplishing 
its work. The different types of agent are discussed below. 
a) Honeypot_agent: Honeypots are the arsenals to 
different new attack tools as well as attackers [18,19]. 
Honeypot agents are programs that create sockets with 
user given port value. Whenever the network is scanned 
by any external entity, these ports seem to be open 
either to the tool or to the attacker. The connection 
identifier is extracted and written to a file. 
b) TCP_UDP_agent: This agent program extracts the 
total number of TCP & UDP packets corresponding to a 
given connection. This agent is primarily concerned of 
detecting any form of TCP & UDP flood attack [20]. 
c) Slowloris_agent: This agent program is responsible of 
extracting incomplete HTTP header corresponding to a 
given connection. A complete and normal HTTP header 
ends with two carriage returns. In this aspect, any 
HTTP packet non-terminated by two carriage returns is 
considered incomplete and the corresponding identity is 
recorded [21]. 
d) Sql_agent: This agent program is responsible of 
extracting any requested HTTP URL, and 
corresponding test for any SQL injection parameters in 
the URL. If found, the identity is recorded for further 
fuzzy calculation.  
e) Syn_flood_agent: This agent program is responsible of 
identifying SYN flood attack by a remote host. If found 
any, the record is extracted and stored for further 
processing [22]. 
f) Brute_force_agent: This agent program records all the 
possible brute force login attempts including 'ssh'. The 
advantage of agent approach is that it is scalable. Any 
number of agents can be created for integration with the 
proposed method. Therefore, the size of the set of 
agents (like PRR) increases over time. 
g) SSH_agent: This agent program is a ssh bot. If an open 
ssh port is found, it attempts brute force ssh login into 
the remote system. Once successful, this agent program 
uploads a malicious script into the remote system [23]. 
h) Monitor_agent: This agent program monitors all the 
activities that takes place on the critical directory. 
Whenever a process on the system performs any 
operation such as read, write or delete on any of the 
files in the critical directory, the process is recorded for 
further analysis. If the process turns out to be malicious, 
it is terminated and thereby, further casualty is 
restricted. 
 
A. AGENTS AND SPACE COMPLEXITY  
It is observed that each critical node in the network runs a 
number of agents. With higher number of agents running in 
each node increases the chances of detecting previously 
known attacks. However, the complexity both in terms of 
space and time increases with higher number of agents. If x1, 
x2, ... xn are the different agents running in the critical node 
and a1, a2, a3 ... are the respective space complexity of each 
agent then considering the resultant space complexity would 
be, 
y = ∑i=1n ai 
If y is less than or equal to 50% (ideally 50% left for 
other services running on the critical node not part of PIRIDS) 
of total amount of available primary memory then the critical 
node with all active agents would function well, otherwise, 
the agents may not have enough primary memory for 
execution and the execution may fail rendering PIRIDS 
model to fail in a critical node. 
 
B. ATTACK DETECTION AND AGENTS 
All the agents in a PIRIDS model runs in parallel and 
therefore looking for a pattern of known attack in an 
incoming connection identifier or an incoming packet is not 
sequential for different types of attack. The number of attacks 
detected by Layer 1 of the PIRIDS model is proportional to 
the number of agents, i.e., if M is the number of different 
types of agents then the number of different types of attack 
that can be detected by Level 1 can be given by, 
A=k * M, 
where, A is the number of different types of attacks 
detected and ‘k’ is a multiplication constant which 
determines how many types of attack a given agent can 
detect. 
 IV. EPIDEMIC MODEL  
The epidemic model gives a rough representation of 
influence of malicious programs on the proportion of 
functioning systems on the network [31]. As shown in 
figure 6, A1 is the first infectious class i.e. if there are ‘N’ 
working systems in the network and the attacker attacks ‘n’ 
systems (n<N) then, these ‘n’ systems are placed in A1. ‘A’ 
is the number of susceptible systems in the network. The 
inclusion of new number of nodes is ‘b’ and ‘d’ is the 
natural crush of the nodes in a given class. If ‘θ’ is the 
infectivity contact rate, then the infection will spread from 
class A1 as well as new systems infected in A. Therefore, 
the changes in ‘A’ with respect to time is given by equation 
1. If η is the removal rate of systems due to hyper response 
in analogy to plants, then R1 is the set of removed class. If 
‘k’ number of systems are removed due to non-probability 
of recovery, then n-k remaining infected nodes still can 
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infect other systems in the network. This set of remaining 
nodes is the infectious class A2. If a system is under 
extensive attack of a malicious program such that it is 
rendered non-functional, then it is considered a dead 
system.  
 
FIGURE 6. Flow of malicious program in network 
 
The variables used are explained below. 
A: Susceptible nodes in the network 
B: Rate of new inclusion of nodes 
E: Exposed nodes in the network 
A1: First Infectious class  
A2: Second infectious class 
R2: Set of recovered nodes 
R1: Removed class 
D: Rate of natural crush of nodes 
α: Infectious rate in class 1 (A1) 
β: Recovery rate in infectious class 2 (A2) 
θ: Infectivity contact rate 
τ: Infectious rate in E 
µ: Death rate due to attack 
η: Removal rate in infectious class 1 (hyper response) 
 
We can model the malicious attack in the network in a set 
of equations as follows. 
∂A/dt = b - (θAA1 + dA)   (1) 
∂E/dt = θAA1 - (dE + τE )   (2) 
∂A1/dt = τE - (d + η + α + µ)A1  (3) 
∂A2/dt =  αA1 - (d + β + µ)A2     (4) 
∂R1/dt =  ηA1    (5) 
∂R2/dt = βA2 - dR    (6) 
The entire network system will be in equilibrium 
provided the following is met. 
∂A/dt = 0 
∂E/dt = 0 
∂A1/dt = 0 
∂A2/dt = 0 
 
 Once the equilibrium point is met it is observed that the 
changes in the numbers in the class A, E, A1, A2 are zero 
i.e. no further changes in the infection rate of systems in the 
network. The work we are doing can be modeled through 
these equations (1) to (6). 
V. UNDERSTANDING PIRIDS BY REFERRING TO 
WYSIWYE ATTACK 
The working behaviour of PIRIDS can be better understood 
by assuming a scenario of attack. The steps of WYSIWYE 
attack are listed below. 
 
1. The attacker searches the Internet for possible RDP 
open ports (3389) using Internet search engine like 
Shodan. 
2. Once an open RDP port is discovered, popular tools 
like NLBrute is used for brute forcing RDP login. 
3. On successful login, the entire process of encryption 
may run in the following steps: 
(a) The attacker generates a public key say Kp and a 
private key Ks. 
(b) The symmetric key Ksecret for encrypting the files is 
embedded with the payload encrypted with the 
public key Kp. 
(c) Once the payload is downloaded in the victim 
system, a specific program may contact the C2 
(Command and control) server for downloading 
the private key Kp. 
(d) Once the private key Kp is obtained, it decrypts the 
symmetric key that is encrypted and run the 
symmetric encryption algorithm with the 
decrypted key on the destination files/directories 
for encryption.  
(e) It might also happen that the payload generates a 
pair of asymmetric keys for encryption. The public 
key is then used for encryption and the private key 
is pushed back to the C2 server. 
(f) Upon command by the attacker, specific 
files/folders on the victim machine are encrypted. 
 
Any system under this attack may end up with 
compromised and encrypted data in the hard disk. We try to 
readdress the situation by assuming that the PIRIDS agents 
are up and running in the victim machine. Let us consider 
two scenarios. 
 
A. SCENARIO 1 – INACTIVE RDP 
Remote Desktop Services (RDP) is not necessary to be 
enabled for the organization. In this first scenario, we are 
assuming that RDP protocol is not necessary to be in an 
active state in any of the system in the network of the 
organization. We are assuming all the agents of the PIRIDS 
model are active and running in the critical nodes of the 
network. One of the agents is the Honeypot_agent and is 
falsely hosting port 3389. If an attacker or a bot happens to 
scan this system in the Internet and finds this port open, it 
sends a connection request to this port. As mentioned in the 
three-layer defense of plant, the first level of defense is the 
PRR (Pattern Recognition Receptors). The Honeypot_agent 
is the PRR in our method. The Honeypot_agent extracts the 
metadata like the connection parameters and block this 
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source IP address. The source IP address is distributed to 
other critical nodes in the network and the list of `blocked 
IP' is updated. This ensures that further connection request 
from the bot is no longer entertained and the attack fails to 
progress further. 
 
B. SCENARIO 2 – ACTIVE RDP 
RDP is necessary to be in active mode for the organization. 
If the RDP port is necessary to be kept open in the 
organization, the following cases might arise with PIRIDS 
active in the critical nodes. 
 
(a) Multiple login attempt: Once the attacker/bot 
discovers open RDP, it will brute force for successful 
login. The Brute_force_agent of the PIRIDS, which 
acts like a PRR of plants, extracts the total number of 
brute force login attempts and generates as stated in 
the algorithm a fuzzy membership value. If this value 
surpasses the fuzzy threshold, the metadata of the 
connection link i.e. source IP address is extracted and 
blocked. The IP list `blocked list' is updated and 
distributed to other critical nodes of the network. This 
behaviour is similar to SAR (Systemic Acquired 
Resistance) of plants. If there happens to be 
connection request from the same attacker 
machine/bot to other critical node of the organization 
in a later time, the connection is immediately dropped. 
(b) Successful login attempt before fuzzy threshold is 
met: The RDP login may be successful in a few 
attempts and PIRIDS might still detect it as legitimate 
just because the corresponding fuzzy membership 
value have not exceeded the threshold. In such a case, 
the attacker ends up successfully establishing a 
connection with the critical node. A possible 
ransomware payload is uploaded to the victim's 
system. A specific malicious program downloads the 
cryptographic key for decrypting the symmetric key 
for encryption. Once all of this is done, let us assume 
the attacker chooses the folder that is marked as 
‘critical’ by the user for encryption (as WYSIWYE 
attacks allows the attacker this facility). As previously 
assumed the PIRIDS agents are already up and 
running. 
 
One of the agents is Monitor_agent. The role of the 
Monitor_agent is to monitor all the processes interacting 
with any files in the critical directory. The process ID of 
those process are extracted and certain activity record by 
those process such as number of read operation, write 
operation, delete operation, cryptographic library 
invocation etc. are marked. A fuzzy membership value is 
then computed. If the fuzzy membership value exceeds the 
threshold, that process interacting with the critical directory 
is immediately blocked and terminated. If the ransomware 
process starts accessing the critical directory for encryption, 
it starts reading the files and starts encrypting them. Thus, 
the number of read and write operations increases. The 
Monitor_agent records this value and computes the fuzzy 
membership value. If significant number of read, write or 
delete is occurring, the fuzzy threshold value exceeds and 
the Monitor_agent blocks the ransomware process. 
Therefore, further infection of files is immediately stopped 
in the system. The meta data of the process such as the 
process signature is distributed in the network so that other 
critical nodes can immediately look for the presence of the 
process with this signature in their respective system and if 
it finds one then block the process from future execution. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The experiment was carried out in the following phases as 
follows. First, different attack instances were injected into 
PIRIDS. Second, comparative analysis of some parameters 
with SNORT as the base reference [24]. In the first instance, 
different attack instances were generated and injected into 
PIRIDS. The primary attack that were tested are as follows: 
(1) TCP Flood (2) UDP Flood (3) Brute Force (4) SQL 
Injection and (5) Slowloris. 
Using the Scapy tool in Linux, incoming packets were 
sniffed. The respective attribute values were extracted, and 
the corresponding fuzzy membership value computed. Every 
connecting source IP address in this manner gets a fuzzy 
membership value. The fuzzy membership function 
considered for detecting TCP flood, UDP flood and Brute 
Force in Linear and given by µA(x)= (x-a)/(b-a), where a is 
the lower bound and b is the upper bound value for x. 
For SQL injection, the membership function used is 
singleton. The different parameter value considered for 
different membership function and different attacks against 
an IP address, are as follows: 
(a) TCP Flood: Lower bound value 3000 - Upper bound 
value 1000  
(b) UDP Flood: Lower bound value 3000 - Upper bound 
value 4000  
(c) Brute Force: Lower bound value 50 - Upper bound 
value 100 
(d) SQL Injection: Lower bound value 1 - Upper bound 
value 1 
 
Using the fuzzy membership function, once the fuzzy 
value is computed, it is compared with the fuzzy threshold 
value. For experimental purposes the fuzzy threshold value is 
fixed at 0.5. Table I shows the different connection 
parameters injected into a system with active PIRIDS model, 
from different IP instances. The experiment is carried out in a 
LAN and the IP address are private in nature and belongs to 
class C type address as follows: 
(a) TCP flood: 192.168.63.151 
(b) UDP flood: 192.168.63.162 
(c) Brute force:192.168.62.157 (on a VLAN) 
(d) SQL injection:192.168.62.156 (on a VLAN) 
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(e) Slowloris: 192.168.63.156 
 
Table II shows the fuzzy membership values 
corresponding to different addresses. For computing these 
fuzzy membership values, the different fuzzy membership 
functions as discussed before are used. The significance of 
each of the table column and row attributes are explained 
below. 
⚫ No. of TCP/UDP packets - This attribute indicates the 
total number of TCP or UDP packets from a source IP 
address. 
⚫ No. of TCP/UDP Connection - This attribute indicates 
the  total number of TCP/UDP connection request from 
a source IP address. 
⚫ Incomplete HTTP - This attribute indicates the total 
number of incomplete i.e. open HTTP packets from an 
IP address. 
⚫ False Ports - This attribute indicates the total number of 
connection attempt from an IP address into the false 
service hosted. 
⚫ SQL attempt - This attribute indicates the total number 
of  SQL Injection attempted from a source IP address. 
⚫ SU attempt - This attribute indicates the total number of 
super users attempted from a source IP address. 
⚫ TCP Flood - This attribute indicates if any attack of the 
form TCP flood is ongoing or likely from an IP address. 
⚫ UDP Flood - This attribute indicates if any attack of the 
form UDP flood is ongoing or likely from an IP 
address. 
⚫ Brute Force - This attribute indicates if any brute force 
attack is ongoing or likely from an IP address. 
⚫ SQL Injection - This attribute indicates if any attack of 
the  form SQL injection is ongoing or likely from an IP 
address. 
⚫ Slowloris - This attribute indicates if any attack of the 
form slowloris is ongoing or likely from an IP address. 
 
The last column of the Table II takes the maximum fuzzy 
value of the entire tuple. Whichever parameter have the 
maximum fuzzy value, is the indication of the corresponding 
type of intrusion attempt. If this value exceeds the threshold 
value, consequent actions are taken to block the source 
identifier soon from further hampering the network.  
 
TABLE I. DIFFERENT ATTACK INSTANCES INJECTED INTO PIRIDS 
 TCP/UDP 
packets 
TCP/UDP 
Connections 
Incomplete 
HTTP 
False 
Ports 
SQL 
attempt 
SU 
attempt 
TCP flood 2000 2000 20 15 0 15 
UDP 
flood 
3000 2000 20 15 0 15 
Brute 
force 
500 200 0 0 0 200 
SQL 
Injection 
100 10 0 0 5 0 
Slowloris 200 30 30 0 0 0 
 
The corresponding fuzzy values against Table I are shown in 
Table II. The maximum fuzzy membership value of 0.98 and 
0.56 from Table II exceeds the minimum value of 0.5. Hence 
the source identifier corresponding to them is blocked. 
 
TABLE II. FUZZY MEMBERSHIP VALUE CORRESPONDING TO SOURCE ADDRESS 
 TCP/ 
UDP 
packets 
TCP/ 
UDP 
Connections 
Incomplete 
HTTP 
False 
Ports 
SQL 
attempt 
SU 
attempt 
Fuzzy 
value 
TCP flood 0.1999 0.9763 0.25 0.005 0 0.055 0.98 
UDP flood 1 0.9763 0.25 0.005 0 0.055 1 
Brute 
force 
0.049 0.004 0 0 0 1 1 
SQL 
Injection 
0.009 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Slowloris 0.019 0.001 0.55 0 0 0 0.56 
 
TABLE III. DIFFERENT OPERATIONS ON CRITICAL RESOURCES INSIDE 
CRITICAL DIRECTORY 
No of read operation 400 
No. of write operation 200 
Cryptographic library invoked 1 
No. of external connections 10 
Process execution time 1200 
 
From our mapping of the IP addresses, 192.168.63.151 
and 192.168.63.156 are blocked from future access of the 
network. The iptables are updated to drop packets from 
respective source. At times a connection may be successful 
in breaching the first layer of defense and deploys a 
malicious process into the end system. During such situations 
a similar approach like the second layer of defense or indirect 
approach of pathogen recognition in plants is adopted [11]. 
The critical nodes in the network maintain a directory which 
is marked as critical. All critical files are stored in this critical 
directory. Process interacting with the critical directory are 
identified and assigned a fuzzy membership degree of 
anomalous process. The monitoring agent addressed before is 
responsible for this. The snapshot of a monitoring agent 
detecting any activity in the critical directory is shown in 
Figure 7. The process identifier of the process accessing files 
in the critical directory named test_folder is identified by the 
monitor agent as 19251. The monitor agent later on assigns a 
fuzzy membership value to this identifier and if it exceeds 
fuzzy threshold, that process is blocked. Table III shows 
different number of operations by a process, say X, in the 
critical directory. A critical directory is the directory holding 
all the critical resources. The significance of attributes in 
Table III are as follows: 
• No. of read operation - This attribute indicates the 
number of read operation by a process in the critical 
directory. 
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• No. of write operation - This attribute indicates the 
number of write operation by a process in the critical 
directory. 
• Cryptography library invoked - This attribute indicates 
the number of times the inbuilt cryptography library of a 
system is invoked. Process like ransomware [25] 
sometimes uses the inbuilt cryptography library to 
encrypt data. If a process calls such functions, it is likely 
to be suspected. 
• No. of external connections - This attribute indicates the 
total number of external connections a process is trying 
to create. Process like Trojan [26] establishes a remote 
connection i.e. creates a backdoor to a remote bot server. 
Therefore, it is important to monitor any process trying 
to create an external connection. 
• This attribute indicates how long the process have been 
executing in seconds. 
 
TABLE IV. FUZZY MEMBERSHIP VALUE OF PROCESS 
Process X 
No. of read operation 0.71 
No. of write operation 0.0357 
No. of delete operation 0.222 
No. of cryptography library invoked 1 
No. of external connection 0.33 
Process execution time 0.51 
Fuzzy membership value 0.22 
 
TABLE V. COMPARATIVE ATTACK DETECTION BY SNORT AND PIRIDS 
 SQL 
Injection 
Slowloris 
attack 
SSH worm 
detection 
DoS 
attack 
SNORT Yes No No  Yes 
PIRIDS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Monitor agent monitoring activity in critical directory 
 
Table IV is the fuzzy table corresponding to process 
operation X shown in Table III. In Table IV the minimum 
fuzzy membership value is considered. This is because a 
process which performs all the operations as mentioned in 
Table III is a suspected malicious process or a probable 
ransomware. The suspected degree or fuzzy membership 
value is the intersection of all the operations mentioned in 
Table III.  
The comparison of PIRIDS is done with respect to Snort 
[24]. Snort is installed on a system in a LAN. Since Snort is 
an open source IDS, the system installed with Snort behaves 
as the IDS sensor. One other system in the same LAN is 
installed with all the PIRIDS agent. Attacks are hosted both 
into PIRIDS and Snort from other systems in the LAN. In 
Table V, a comparison of few selected attacks for both 
PIRIDS and SNORT are shown, where we can see that Snort 
fails to detect some attacks. 
A. TEST CASE WITH SSH BOT 
SSH worm in a network scan for available open SSH ports. If 
it finds one, it establishes a connection using brute force to 
the remote port and uploads a copy of the malicious script 
into the remote host for execution. The script executed in the 
remote host might compromise the host system.  
Thus, initially the SHH bot discovers an end system with 
open SSH port. It than brute force SSH for successful login. 
Once it gains access through SSH, it uploads the payload 
script. The payload script is responsible of initiating the 
malicious activities on the victim machine. The script further 
scans the network for propagation. This is how the malicious 
scripts accomplish exponential growth in the network. This 
experiment was not carried out in any sandbox environment 
and was run on actual machines with shared memory 
resources i.e. a network of machines in a LAN were 
considered as the test bed for the experiment. It was 
eventually found that the SSH bot could infect successfully 
other systems in the network thereby expanding the bot 
network. The SSH Brute force and SSH bot propagation is 
discussed below along with the response of both Snort and 
PIRIDS. SSH brute force can be successfully detected in 
Snort if number of attempts exceeds the defined threshold. 
The rule set in SNORT for detecting SSH brute force attempt 
is shown below. As indicative of the rule if a login attempt is 
made for 15 or more times, SNORT alert a message. 
alert tcp EXTERNAL_NET any → HOME_NET 22 
(msg:"Possible SSH brute forcing!"; flags: S+; threshold: 
type both, track by_src, count 15, seconds 
30;sid:10000001; rev: 1;). 
 
The significance of the parameters is not explained here 
and holds the same meaning as in a standard SNORT rule 
structure. The situation worsens in SNORT, if the brute 
force is successful before the defined limit. However, 
before exceeding the threshold limit, the SSH brute force 
for login parameters such as username and password, 
SNORT doesn't generate any alarm.  
 Figure 8 illustrates that after successful brute force of 
password, the script injects a malicious code into the 
remote host. The figure indicates that the attacker tries to 
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upload the SSH bot script ‘ssh_bot_upload.py’ in the 
remote user 192.168.63.151. The malicious script is 
successfully uploaded in the remote host. This script further 
continues with its execution of malicious intention. SNORT 
have no way to monitor this uploading or operation of any 
malicious script in the host.  
 
FIGURE 8. SSH remote host payload inject 
 
Figure 9 shows the encryption in critical directory being 
carried out by malicious program and the corresponding 
detection by the monitor agent. It clearly indicates the 
encryption of files in progress by the malicious program and 
it also indicates that the activities of malicious program are 
detected successfully by the monitor agent. The monitor 
agent immediately extracts the signature of this process and 
distributes it to other peers in the network. This signature will 
be a part of monitoring PRR among other peers as mentioned 
earlier and as such even after successful SSH login from a 
bot, its attempt to upload and execute the malicious script 
will fail in the very first instance next time and thereby 
stopping the propagation of the bot in the network.  
 
7915 RO /home/ubuntu/test_folder/automation.jar  
7915 O /home/ubuntu/test_folder/(encrypted)automation.jar 
7915 R /home/ubuntu/test_folder/automation.jar (deleted) 
7915 RO /home/ubuntu/test_folder/httpclient-4.4.1.jar  
7915 O /home/ubuntu/test_folder/(encrypted)httpclient-4.4.1.jar 
7915 O/home/ubuntu/test_folder/httpclient-4.4.1.jar (deleted)  
 
Done encrypting /home/ubuntu/test_folder/groovy-all-2.4.6.jar 
Done encrypting /home/ubuntu/test_folder/commons-logging-1.2.jar 
Done encrypting /home/ubuntu/test_folder/automation.jar  
 
FIGURE 9. Encryption detected and traced in critical directory 
 
If SSH service is not required in the network, Snort 
doesn't provide the feature of hosting false services as 
honeypot whereas PIRIDS provides the feature to host false 
services. If connection is attempted to a false service, it is a 
potential bot program scanning open ports in the network. 
The SSH agent in PIRIDS detects the SSH connection 
attempt (honeypot service) and the source IP is blocked, 
restricting the worm from getting installed and further 
propagation. 
 
 
FIGURE 10. SSH worm infection spread 
 
In Figure 10, a comparative plot of worm infection spread 
rate is shown. In a network with Snort installed as an IDS, 
the possibility of SSH worm infection spread is significantly 
high. However, in PIRIDS, the worm is identified by hosting 
false services in the network (honeypot agent). Whenever an 
attacker or a bot program sends a connection to the hosted 
false services the attacker's identity is found and blocked 
from accessing the network. This blocks further 
communication by the IP using SSH and therefore the source 
IP fails to upload the malicious script and therefore, the 
infection spread is limited. From Figure 10 it can be seen that 
in a network implementing Snort, there is high risk of a 
malware bot propagation. With open port scanning and bot 
installation, the attack may grow exponentially with the 
available number of systems. However, in a network with 
PIRIDS implementation, the number of infections is almost 
near to none. This is because, the moment a peer identifies 
the malicious process, it extracts the signature and distributes 
among its peers immediately.  
 
B. TEST CASE WITH SLOWLORIS ATTACK 
Slowloris attack have been recently popular and it is an 
application layer DoS attack. We have hosted this attack in 
the network and studied the response behaviour of both 
Snort and PIRIDS. The rule to detect open HTTP 
connection in Snort can be framed to only fire alerts if 
certain number of threshold say T_n connection attempts or 
more occur from the same source within a certain time 
window T_w. However, if connections are kept open or 
made every period T_w without meeting the threshold limit 
ubuntu@ubuntu#:~$ python ssh_bot_upload.py 192.168.63.151 
ubuntu@123 payload.py     
 
ubuntu@ubuntu#:~$ ssh ubuntu@192.168.63.151  
ubuntu@192.168.63.151’s password: 
Welcome to ubuntu 14.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.2.0-35-generic 
x86_640) 
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com/ 
430 packages can be updated 
0 updates are security updates 
 
Last login: Sat Jun 17 18:14:40 2017 from 192.168.63.222 
locale: Cannot set LC_CTYPE to default locale: No such file or 
directory 
locale: Cannot set LC_MESSAGES to default locale: No such file or 
directory 
locale: Cannot set LC_ALL to default locale: No such file or 
directory 
 
ubuntu2@ubuntu#:~$ cd /tmp 
ubuntu2@ubuntu#:/tmp$ ls    
Mongodb-27017.sock payload.py   
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but do an overall flood of open HTTP connection, the Snort 
detection will fail. 
 
 
FIGURE 11. Slowloris detection 
 
Snort rule for slowloris detection in a time window of 
30 sec may look as follows: 
 
alert tcp EXTERNAL_NET any → HOME_NET 
HTTP_PORTS (msg:"SlowLoris.py DoS 
attempt";flow:established,to_server,no_stream; 
content:"X-a:"; detection_filter:track by_dst, count 50,  
seconds 30;classtype:denial-of-service; sid:1; rev:1; ) 
 
Some of the fields are explained as follows: 
⚫ no_stream: This added to flow option tells the Stream5 
preprocessor not to bother checking how the content 
relates in the context of the reassembled stream. 
⚫ X-a: Each connection is kept alive with an incomplete 
HTTP GET request by sending an additional X-a header 
field every so often. 
⚫ count: The total number of packets received in the time 
window for the rule to be active. 
⚫ seconds: If count number of packets are received from 
the same source within the ``seconds'' window, the snort 
rule is activated. 
 
From the graph shown in Figure 11 it can be interpreted 
that PIRIDS (blue line) response to Slowloris attack is stable. 
With increasing number of open HTTP packets injected into 
the critical node, the degree of detection increases eventually. 
This is the reason the attack cannot be immediately detected. 
Once the fuzzy threshold is exceeded, the source identifier is 
immediately blocked, and the probable attack is terminated 
before it overtakes the system or lead to any form of Denial 
of Service attack (DoS). Irrespective of any time window 
frame, the fuzzy membership value for attack increases with 
increasing open number of HTTP connections in PIRIDS. 
However, this behaviour is different in Snort. It is observed 
that if the number of open HTTP connections exceeds the 
threshold value defined in the Snort rule and met within the 
time window, Snort successfully detects the attack (red mark 
indicated). Snort fails to detect the Slowloris attack in 
circumstances where the number of open HTTP connections 
are below the threshold in the time window frame but 
exceeds the threshold limit outside the time window frame 
(green mark indicated). 
   
FIGURE 12. TCP SYN flood attack 
 
C. DOS ATTACK USING TCP SYN FLOOD 
Both the systems, Snort and PIRIDS were tested against 
DoS using TCP SYN flood attack. Both the systems could 
detect and raise alarm. Figure 12 gives a comparative view 
of both Snort and PIRIDS. It is observed from Figure 10 
that the probability of detection is 1 by both Snort and 
PIRIDS, whenever, the SYN packets exceeds the maximum 
defined limit. From Figure 12, the probability of SYN flood 
detection is 1 when the number of SYN packets exceed or 
equal to the value 100000. 
 
D. TEST CASE WITH SIMPLE RANSOMWARE 
The most generic ransomware running in the Internet 
basically accomplish two operations. First it encrypts the 
file it gains access to and later deletes the original 
unencrypted files, leaving behind the encrypted files only in 
the system [27]. This basic principle is considered and the 
proposed method PIRIDS is endowed with the capability to 
detect ransomware process running on a system. It is again 
observed that Snort fails to achieve the same. An open 
source malicious activity monitoring software called 
ClamAV [28] was adopted for the comparison. It was 
observed that ClamAV failed to detect the ransomware 
running on the system. However, PIRIDS could detect the 
ransomware after some initial time. The total number of 
files deleted in comparison to ClamAV was significantly 
less. The comparative graph can be seen in Figure 13. The 
number of files deleted is linear with respect to number of 
files present in the critical directory. The initial successful 
deletion of files in PIRIDS is due to fuzzy membership 
value computation of the process. Once the fuzzy 
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membership value of the process exceeds the threshold, the 
process is immediately blocked, and data deletion depletes 
to zero. Table IV shows the fuzzy membership value 
computed for a ransomware like process. 
 
FIGURE 13. File deletion comparison under ransomware like attack 
 
 
FIGURE 14. Packet drop ratio 
 
E. RESPONSE TO NETWORK TRAFFIC 
We wanted to see the response to network traffic and 
different traffic variations were created using LOIC [29] 
tool in Windows OS. In high and fast traffic packets 
dropped were observed in PIRIDS and Snort. Figure 14 
shows the packet drop comparison in the different traffic 
circumstances. It can be observed that packet handling is 
slightly better in Snort in comparison to PIRIDS, though 
PIRIDS is not far behind. 
F. CPU RESOURCE UTILIZATION 
In any IDS system resource including CPU utilization is 
critical. Figure 15 shows the CPU utilization by SNORT 
under TCP Flood attack. During this time other rules in 
Snort were disabled. There is a Linux utility that can 
monitor program that is using CPU and consuming the most 
of memory. This utility ‘dstat’ is able of generate system 
resources statistics. When a system's CPU cores are all 
occupied executing the code of current processes, other 
processes must wait until a CPU core becomes free or the 
scheduler switches a CPU core to run their code. If too 
many processes are queued too often, this can represent a 
bottleneck in the performance of the system. As shown in 
Figure 15, the encircled parameters show the CPU process 
utilization by Snort. The format of dstat command is as 
follows: 
dstat -c --top-cpu -dn --top-mem 
The significance of some of the parameters are as follows: 
--top-cpu (shows most expensive CPU process) 
--top-mem (shows process using the most memory) 
 
 
Figure 15. CPU utilization by SNORT under flood attack 
Figure 16 shows the CPU utilization by the detector agent 
of PIRIDS. As shown in Figure 16 the process encircled is 
the PIRIDS agent and shows the CPU process utilization. 
The utilization value is significantly smaller than that of 
shown in case of Snort. Figure 17 displays a comparative 
result of resource utilization in both Snort and PIRIDS 
where PIRIDS is much better. 
As a final discussion, the Artificial Immune System (AIS) 
has been widely explored for use in IDS [30]. Even though 
AIS has found a wide applicability in network security, there 
are a lot of challenges in its real implementation such as, (1) 
Identifying the size of detector set and generating a true 
detector set (2) Identifying the self and the non-self set and 
(3) Incorporating every new file or a new network connection 
feature to be a part of self or non-self and subsequently 
generating new detector set. The approach of AIS suffers 
autoimmune attack. If file resources stored in a system are 
considered self-cells, then the system fully trust the self-cells 
and the intersection of the detector set with the self-cell set is 
null or void. Therefore, if a file stored in a system and 
considered trusted starts mal-functioning, it becomes difficult 
for the AIS to detect such behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 16. CPU utilization during TCP flood on PIRIDS 
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Figure 17. Comparative CPU utilization during TCP flood attack 
 
 The proposed system PIRIDS overcomes this difficulty 
of the AIS. If a malicious program successfully breaches the 
defense system and infects a system resource, the model has 
a way of detecting it through the guard agent of the model. 
The difficulty of generating self and non-self set doesn't hold. 
The diversity of attack can be detected in the PIRIDS by 
incorporating new receptor agents. This avoid matching each 
incoming pattern unlike in AIS with each detector set 
element. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this work a bio-inspired method of intrusion detection and 
response model namely Plant-based Inspiration of Response 
in IDS (PIRIDS) is proposed. The experimental evaluation of 
the proposed model has very well demonstrated that the 
model is dynamic enough to incorporate receptor agents to 
detect known attacks. Any zero-day attack intend to hamper 
any services or resources of the critical node can be 
identified. The signature of the potential malicious program 
could be extracted, and the infection spread in the network 
could be stopped. The experiments demonstrate that the 
proposed model outperforms established open source IDS 
Snort in many ways and specially in responding to 
ransomware attacks. The proposed model has also performed 
well with CPU resource utilization. The model with further 
improvements and incorporation of evolutionary attack 
design techniques can be made as a standard for detecting 
attacks and generating responses subsequent to attacks. 
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